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CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION 
Cultural heritage tourism not only works on the prosperity of the region, but also allows for profits 
to be used for cultural heritage site conservation. However, as tourism development is often 
originating from national governments as a broader development strategy, room for conflicts of 
interests can develop at the periphery or local level. When political, economic and cultural interests 
appear together in a decentralized manner, it leads to a big discourse which aren’t easily resolved 
when not handled properly. The aim of this paper is to analyse the conflicts of interest involved in 
cultural heritage tourism, and the possible ways of handling them best. The main focus of this 
analysis is the comparison of two heritage sites’ management and discourses that are connected to 
these sites’ tourism development. The case studies considered herein are Tanah Lot in Bali 
(Indonesia) and Shuri Castle in Okinawa (Japan). The comparison of these two heritage sites were 
chosen because of their major similarities. They are both situated in peripheral provinces with a 
main economic focus in tourism due to their location and cultural and historical value. Also in both 
cases there is a visible tension between the state and local community which causes problems. 
Comparison of Tanah Lot and Shuri Castle heritage management shows self interest and 
mismanagement create more disputes around tourism development than operation on a law and 
regulations . In case of Bali, Master Plan 71 violation caused significant tension between local 
community and tourism developers. On the other hand Okinawa has no big discourses around 
Tourism Development, which might be caused by strong control over heritage tourism 
management. Moreover, different official strategy (cultural heritage tourism vs. mass tourism ) for 
tourism development might be the reason for different situations between Bali and Okinawa. 
Through the research it was concluded that small scale tourism would be more beneficial for local 
population than mega projects development.  
Paper Outline 
The current chapter provides the background information necessary for the aims of this paper. 
After a brief discussion about the methods and methodologies used herein, the case studies will be 
introduced.  The following two chapters examines the conflicts and discourses connected to the 
heritage site tourism development in Bali and Okinawa. Chapter 2 discusses the centre-periphery 
relationship in tourism development, and appropriates the need for centralized planning without 
ignoring the livelihood of those on the periphery. After an explanation of how official tourism policy 
in Indonesia started with a cultural tourism approach and changed by mass tourism, two cases will 
be illustrated,when the tension between locals and the state was the highest. Japan-Okinawa 
relations will be discussed in the second half of chapter two, suggesting tourism development can 
be beneficial for both centre and periphery. Finally, chapter 3 explores further problems caused by 
chosen official development strategy. 
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In each chapter, the Bali and Okinawa cases will be examined one by one and the comparison with 
following results are in the conclusion part of every chapter. 
Method and Methodologies 
The paper combines secondary data analysis, comparative case study and discourse analysis. For 
the purpose of the research, I analyze discourses occurring around heritage tourism development 
as a way to construct particular knowledge(s) with regard to specific historical situations. 
As a comparative case study examines in rich detail the context and features of two or more 
instances of specific phenomena, this paper focuses on cultural heritage tourism discourses in 
Okinawa (Japan) and Bali (Indonesia) concerning to heritage sites: Shuri-jō and Tanah Lot to 
discover contrasts, similarities, or patterns across the cases.  
The data needed for the intended analyses were gathered from both primary sources and 
multidisciplinary secondary sources. Primary data includes legal documents, testimonies and 
institutional reports regarding (heritage) tourism and its policy. The information was gathered 
online from governmental institution websites. Newspaper articles, including those published in 
Bali Province and Okinawa Prefecture, were also selected sources. Due to the author’s limited 
knowledge in Indonesian languages, sources were primarily in English. however, the Japanese 
portion of the research includes both Japanese and English websites. Furthermore, websites and 
blogs created by non-governmental, private organizations and activists were used. Secondary 
sources were drawn from multidisciplinary literature. 
Introduction Case study: Tanah Lot 
The first case study of the paper – Tanah Lot Pura - is located on the southern shore of Bali within 
the village of Beraban, Tabanan Regency. Bali is a relatively small province of Indonesia, which 
includes the island of Bali and a few smaller neighbouring islands. The province is located at the 
westernmost end of the Lesser Sunda Islands, with Java to the west and Lombok to the east. 
According to the 2013 national census, the population of Bali is approximately 4.1 million (BPS; Bali 
2013), relatively small compared to the state population of 250 million (BPS: Indonesia 2013). The 
capital of Bali province - Denpasar – lies at the southern part of the island, and is the most 
populated city in the province with a population of 835,000 people (BPS 2012), and is a major 
tourist destination.  
Bali is a single Indonesian Province, which is divided into nine Regencies (kabupaten), each with a 
Regent (Bupati), or “little king”. In 1999, following 30 years of highly centralised dictatorship, 
known as New Order (Orde Baru) Regime [1965-1999] under the second Indonesian President 
Suharto, considerable autonomy was given to each of the regencies as an answer to a long period of 
growing distrust and antagonism as to appease separatists (Seymour & Turner, 2002). 
6 
 
Bali was one of the first provinces of Indonesia to develop their tourism industry. Unique culture 
and tropical climate were seen as a commodities, which led to the changes in tourism policy during 
the presidency of Suharto. The culture of Bali came to be seen as a resource to be used to salvage 
the regime’s reputation by promoting tourism growth and economic prosperity, while stimulating 
national pride.  
Tanah Lot Pura, claimed to be the work of the 16th-century Dang Hyang Nirartha, is the prime 
tourist destination for the Tabanan area due to its cultural heritage and aesthetic. It is a Pura Sad 
Kahyangan Hindu temple, which sits on a large offshore rock which has been shaped continuously 
over the years by the ocean tide, known for its majestic sunset scenes and various Hindu religious 
ceremonies throughout the calendar year.  
Introduction Case study: Shuri Castle 
The second case study is Shuri Castle, or Shuri-jō (首里城), located in Okinawa Prefecture, Japan. 
Okinawa is Japan’s southernmost prefecture located 400 miles away from the main Honshū Island. 
It is made up of 160 islands that stretch across 250 miles of Pacific Ocean from the south of Kyūshū 
to the north of Taiwan. The prefecture’s capital city – Naha – which is located on the largest 
Okinawa Hontō Island is the political and economic centre with a population of 323,000(Naha City 
data of March 2015). Shuri Castle, which sits atop a hill, is located in the old royal capital of Shuri, 
which lies several miles north from Naha, and is one of many Gusuku that dot Okinawa and its 
surrounding islands, but it is the only to be fully restored. Although the exact date of its 
construction is unknown, it is generally accepted that it was built in the 14th century, and that 
Shuri Castle was designated as Ryūkyū King’s seat of power.   
Shuri Castle has a tragic history starting with Ryūkyū Kingdom’s fall after the Meiji restoration and 
its surrender in 1879 to Matsuda Michiyuki, who represented Meiji government. Despite 
discrimination towards Okinowa by central Japanese authorities, Shuri Castle’s main hall was 
designated a ‘national treasure’ (kokuhō 国宝) of Japan in 1925, and remains a symbol of Ryūkyū 
Kingdom heritage. Unfortunately it was completely destroyed in the last days of the Battle of 
Okinawa during WWII by an American destructive bombardment, as the 32nd Imperial Army had 
tunnelled its headquarters into the hillside beneath the castle. 
Since Shuri Castle Main Hall (Seiden) was rebuilt in 1992 as a celebration of 20th anniversary of 
Okinawa’s reversion to mainland control, Shuri Castle Park has quickly become Okinawa’s most 
visited tourist site. In 2000, Shuri Castle, the largest wooden building in Okinawa, along with eight 
other historical sites, was added to UNESCO’s World Heritage list as Japan’s eleventh world heritage 
site: “Gusuku [Castle] Sites and Related Properties of the Kingdom of Ryukyu” (UNESCO). 
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The economy of Okinawa Prefecture was deliberately, and still remains, structured in a way to 
maintain dependence on Japanese state, U.S. military and tourism. Tourism as a government policy 
has been one of the principal mechanisms for development in Okinawa (Lorthanavanich 2014: 94). 
The goal of the state is to create the picture of tourist Okinawa as 
 southern islands having beautiful southern island scenery; 
 “paradise” with tropical and subtropical weather with warm winters;  
 green islands of abundant tropical and subtropical vegetation; 
 islands having a unique, distinctive culture; 
 a place where Battle of Okinawa sites can be seen;  
 the location of U.S. strategic bases. 
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CHAPTER 2: CENTRE AND PERIPHERY CONFLICT 
There is a noticeable tension between centre and periphery concerning tourism development of 
heritage sites, and a polarisation that must be understood in light of geopolitical locations and 
identities. Indonesia and Japan have different strategies for tourism development, which, in 
addition to different historical backgrounds, cause different discourses. Nonetheless, both 
discourses are connected to centre-periphery relations due to the top-down approaches taken by 
the federal government.  
The chapter presents how official tourism strategy changed over time and what controversies it 
might have created. The following sub-chapters starts with the tourism development discourse and 
then talks about biggest controversy concerning tourism development at Tanah Lot and Shuri 
Castle. I start with the Indonesian case, because it presents a case of strong opposition by the local 
population to the development driven by the capital, Jakarta. First, the paper focuses on two cases 
in the tourism development of Tanah Lot. The first conflict was caused by the mega-development 
“BNR project”. This case will illustrate growing tension between private business, backed by ruling 
elite of Indonesia, and international interest against the local population of Bali, more precisely 
Beraban village residents. The second case, a clash of ownership over Tanah Lot management 
presents growing interest of Beraban village authorities in Tanah Lot management.  
The second sub-chapter focuses on Okinawa and its tourism development strategy and explains 
origins of tension between Japan, the United States of America, and Okinawa. The last sub-chapter 
examines appeared difficulties in the Shuri Castle reconstruction. 
Tourism Development of Bali 
After coming to power in 1967, Indonesian President Suharto’s New Order government officially 
proclaimed cultural tourism to be a key tool of nation-building (Adams, 1997:157). Tourism growth 
in Bali began in 1969 with the construction of the Ngurah Rai International Airport, allowing 
foreign flights directly into the island, rather than arrival via Jakarta. Hereafter, the first Master Plan 
in 1971 established three tourist zones to inaugurate cultural and mass tourism, where a regional 
culture (kebudayaan daerah) became an integral part of the culture heritage of Indonesia and the 
country principle tourism policy (Hitchcock 2000). The plan for the development of Bali as an 
international tourist destination, financed by the United Nations Development Programme and 
carried out by the World Bank (Long, Wall, 1995: 243) was put into practice in 1975 as the Bali 
Tourism Project.  The goal of the project was to use Bali’s reputation as a tropical paradise and 
island of culture in the service of national development by promoting international tourism, while 
simultaneously shielding the Balinese from what were perceived to be the culturally destructive 
side effects of such tourism. To do so, planners mapped out a tourist–local ‘contact’ zone between 
the Kuta-Sanur beach area and the towns of Ubud and Gianyar. The key organizing forces involved 
in this project, including Balinese provincial leaders and academics, the Indonesian Director-
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General of Tourism, World Bank and United Nations Development Program (UNDP) officials all 
proclaimed success of the project (Shepherd 2002: 64). However, this outcome was viewed from 
contemporary perspective.  
The critical moment of Bali’s development appeared in the period of the late 1980s and early 1990s, 
when deregulation of the banking system in 1987 and an unprecedented investment boom caused 
changes in regional economic development, which had earlier been based on agricultural 
intensification, small-scale tourism and handicraft export. According to the official data of Statistics 
Office, there was a ten-fold increase in foreign and domestic investment in major projects on Bali 
between 1987 and 1988, almost doubling again in 1989-90 (Statistics Office, Bali 1991). When 
tourist zones were expanded to 15 in 1988 and to 21 in 1993 by decree of Governor, 1/3 of the land 
mass and 1/5 of Balinese villages became legally open to commercial exploitation for tourist 
industry. Furthermore, agreements between the Ministries of Forestry, Agriculture and Tourism 
gave access to supposedly protected areas zoned for the purposes of argo- and ecotourism 
development (Warren 1998).  
As a result, during the 1990s Bali became the target for a number of wildly ambitious development 
proposals, designed to transform the overseas tourism market and, at the same time, cater for the 
extravagances of Indonesia’s “New Rich”. The nature and scale of these proposals dwarfed previous 
development projects, directly challenging Bali’s cultural and spiritual integrity, as well as 
undermining its environmental capacity (Shaw 2000). 
In other words, the new direction in tourism industry development reflected what might be called a 
‘mega-complex’ economic expansion and intensifying environmental impacts in the late New Order 
(Warren 1998). Development policy for Bali, as a manifestation of the mega-complex, became 
geared towards gross maximization of the number of tourists who come to the island and the profit 
they generate. This lead to the shift in province-state relations, as local communities felt displaced 
by large tourism projects (Hampton 2005).  
Bali vs. Jakarta: BNR project 
The tourism development case of Tanah Lot will illustrate the change in relationship of peripheral 
provinces to the centre as Jakarta became more pervasive in political and economic influence 
(Warren 1998: 229). The controversy started with the launch of Bali Nirwana Resort (BNR) project, 
one of the new mega-developments determined to turn Tanah Lot area into mass-tourism 
destination.  
It isn’t surprising that mega-projects could be seen as explosive symbols of elite insensitivity to the 
living conditions of ordinary people. The culture of Bali came to be seen as a resource, and its 
function was to facilitate the growth of tourism and foster national pride (Warren 2013: 198). 
Developments like the Golden Garuda monument and Bali Nirwana Resort at Tanah Lot were 
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known to be created and capitalised in Jakarta, and imposed on the local landscape for 
consumption. Bali Post (12/7/93) called these mega-projects “a foreboding invasion, portending a 
direction and scale of development increasingly perceived as a boomerang that would destroy Bali 
and its people” (Warren 2013: 198). Indeed, anxiety that local people were losing control over both 
environmental and cultural resources is pervasive in Bali Post reporting as well as in reader’s 
comments in letters to the editor and in the ‘Your turn’ column. 
The BNR project, which proceeded without adequate community consultation caused a significant 
indignation among local population, who felt purposely disregarded by central authorities. This 
was especially so because the new tourism development had direct and indirect impacts on land 
and water, as well as on the cultural basis of Balinese community life. Indeed, decrease of land and 
water in Bali would mean rice shortage and high prices, directly affecting cost of living for locals. 
Furthermore, BNR project development was significantly guided by opportunism over regulations: 
besides the fact that the project ignored Master Plan of 1971 of “construction-free zone” around 
sacred areas and beaches, in order to maximise benefit from the astounding scenery offered by the 
site, it was also connected with law violation, corruption and human rights abuse (Shaw 2000; 
Warren 2013).  
A distinctive feature of large-scale, highly capitalised mega-projects in Indonesia is ownership 
mostly by interests with close connections to Indonesia’s ruling elite, especially Suharto’s family. 
Further complications are presented by the involvement of a British-based company Time Switch 
Investment Ltd, which is credited as having 80% stake in the hotel and golfing project of BNR. Both 
the military and the political party GOLKAR have allegedly strongly supported connections of the 
Suharto family(Hitchcock 2001; Warren 2013). These new development five-star hotels initiated in 
such projects were furthermore used to host national and international gatherings that have 
enhanced the prestige of Indonesia while simultaneously enriching the Suhartos.  
Public concerns about pollution, land degradation, and water shortage, combined with the violating 
basic Hindu philosophy, requiring the maintenance balance between divine, human and natural 
orders, turned into a public protest against Bali Nirwana Resort project, the first of a new-style 
integrated resort development to be approved for the island.   
Protests, which started in December 1993, were based on cultural and environmental issues 
around construction, although there was no open political parties joined in opposition to the state. 
It must be noted that the generally apolitical orientation of the Balinese has to be understood in the 
context of the traumatic effects of the 1965-1966 massacres which brought the New Order 
government to power (Warren 1998: 245). Despite highly organised social structures at local level, 
Bali has developed surprisingly little organised social movements around the environment or other 
contemporary social issues. When the news of the Tanah Lot project broke, students and 
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intellectuals hastily constituted a coalition to attempt to stop the project. The movement created 
forums including ‘seminars’ in which invited academics, government officials and prominent public 
figures were prompted to make informative, even provocative, statements (Warren 1998: 238). 
However even with press support the resistance groups faced difficulties maintaining coordinated 
action as well as their earlier sense of solidarity. Consequently, this lead to tension between student 
groups, NGOs, dissidents and journalists over ulterior motives. 
For example, the most of the groups allied in the struggle bore religious or cultural names. 
Environment groups remained actively involved but were less visible as environmental discourses 
became subsumed by those of cultural and religious idioms, and the metaphor of erosion was 
overtaken by images of invasion (Warren 1998: 245).  
Notably, the protests were restrained early on, when institutions closer to the centres of power in 
Indonesia proved compliant agents of the interests of corporate capital and its rent-seeking 
political counterparts. This was done in two steps. First, a military commander was replaced by one 
who was willing and would forcibly end the series of demonstrations which had been growing 
steadily larger and attracted mass support. The second event was revocation of publishing licenses 
of three national weeklies – Tempo, Editor and DeTIK – for fuelling controversy surrounding 
Minister Habibie’s defence purchases (Warren 1998: 250).  
Neither cultural nor environmental issues were taken serious, but as the BNR project passed the 
burden of responsibility to the Environmental Impact Assessment Commission (AMDAL), an 8-
month suspension on construction was put in place. Debate centred on ‘zone of sanctity’, a two-
kilometre radius around Tanah Lot Temple. Although the AMDAL required the project to be 
redesigned, eliminating condominiums and relocating buildings away from the temple, in addition 
to planting a green strip to screen the project from view, the final ‘compromise’ only succeeded in 
bringing the number of hotel and residential units back to the total originally determined by the 
1991 National Investment Board permit (Warren 1998: 249-250). On 12 September 1994, the 
AMDAL Commission presented its report, announcing that the Tanah Lot project would proceed, 
thus lifting the suspension. Though construction has been halted, the BNR project was completed in 
a total of six years. 
The official opening of Bali Nirwana Resort or Pan Pacific Nirwana Bali Resort, along with Nirwana 
Bali Golf Club on 3 September 1997 (Nirwana Bali Golf Club 2015; PT MNC LAND Tbk 2015) was 
followed by political changes in the country one year later. As the New Order Regime fell, the 
tension between state and Bali locals in terms of Tanah Lot was reduced as the regencies saw their 
autonomy increase.  
After the acquisition of the Bali Nirwana Resort in 2014 by PT MNC Land Tbk, an Indonesia-based 
company whose business is primarily engaged in resorts and hotels development and management 
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(Jakarta Post 2013), there have been no open disputes about the tourism complex in Tanah Lot 
(Financial Times 2015).  Despite ownership changes, Pan Pacific Nirwana Bali Resort is still 
represented as “an idyllic and peaceful retreat,” nestled in lush natural surroundings away from the 
hustle and bustle of the island. BNR is now known for its expansive gardens and Greg Norman 
designed golf course, “with five ocean-side holes, three cliff-to-cliff tee shots and eight holes 
sculpted into the terraced rice fields” (Pan Pacific Nirwana Bali Resort brochure), but not for being 
the first mega development in Bali which caused such a big resonance in the society.  
Even though BNR project conflict was solved in favour of outsiders, it was a first time, when local 
people showed their interest in tourism development. The fact, that this case illustrates the 
violation of regulations and proves that fact that developers were seeking for self-interest. 
Bali vs Jakarta: Tanah Lot management 
1999 was a year of change in Indonesian centre-periphery relations. After 30 years of highly 
centralised dictatorship, the state gave considerable autonomy to each of the regencies to break a 
long period of growing distrust and disagreement. At the local level, Bali is divided into banjars, 
traditional neighbourhoods, which are territorially, socially and culturally connected. The head of a 
Banjar is democratically elected, and decisions are made representatively by male heads of 
households (Cole 2014). The new found autonomy did not entirely abrogate the tension between 
the Jakarta and Bali. 
Since the change in centre-periphery relations, significant improvements were experienced on the 
local level in the last decade. The Tanah Lot management dispute of 2011, for instance, is an 
example of successful cooperation between Bali Regency authorities and local representatives.  As 
in the BNR project, the involvement of private company’s interest caused identifiable tension 
between the various stakeholders. 
As mentioned above, Tanah Lot Temple is one of the most visited places in Bali and is located on a 
shore within the village of Beraban, District of Kediri, Region of Tabanan. The Tanah Lot is one of 
the most visited places in Bali with over 3 million people coming in 2012, which consists of 1.6 
million domestic and 1.4 million foreign tourists. Moreover the number of tourists visiting in 2013 
increased at 20 percent (The Bali Times 25/01/2014). 
By the time of the conflict, the annual tourism flow in 2010 was around 2.1 people, which generated 
Rp. 18 billion (€1.2 million) by admissions and fees from the operation of Tanah Lot, producing Rp. 
12 billion (€808,000)  income a year (Bali Discovery 2/4/2011). The main concerns of the local 
people of Beraban village was their level of involvement in the management and ‘‘ownership’’ of the 
site income. The tension originated with the end of the cooperative contract term on the 
management of Tanah Lot signed by the Government of Tabanan Regency, CV Ari Jasa Wisata, and 
Beraban Village in 2000, which ended on 1 April 2011 (Mahadewi, Utama 2014). According to the 
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cooperation agreement on the management of Tanah Lot tourism object, or Badan Pengelola Obyek 
Wisata Tanah Lot (BPOWTL), the profit was shared in the following percentages:  
 55% or IDR. 6 billion (€404,000) was distributed to the Tabanan Regency government, 
 20% or IDR. 2 billion (€135,000) was owned by Beraban Village, 
 15% or IDR. 1.8 billion (€121,000) was retained by the tourism sites operator CV. Ary Jasa 
Wisata, 
 5% or IDR. 900 million (€61,000) was divided between Tanah Lot and 8 surrounding 
temples, 
 5% to other 22 administrative villages within the district of Kediri (Bali Discovery 
2/4/2011). 
Most of Beraban villagers expressed support for the management of Tanah Lot tourism complex to 
be handled exclusively by the Government of Tabanan Regency and Beraban Village.  Meanwhile, 
government officials intended for the management to remain as signed back in 2000 and without 
changes to the contract, with the involvement of the private firm CV. Ary Jasa Wisata. 
The villagers of Beraban suggested Tanah Lot be managed exclusively by the local Tabana 
government and Beraban village without the involvement of outside interest. They have suggested 
this without recognizing the significant contributions by CV Ari Jasa Wisata for the tourism 
development of Tanah Lot as a destination, including securing financial assistance from the German 
Embassy and the Provincial Government of Bali to build and enhance the areas of Tanah Lot temple. 
The composition of proceeds suggested by the committee was 50% for the government and 50% 
for the Beraban village, detailing that 70% of the Beraban portion will be received by the village 
and the remaining 30% for the Temple (Pura) itself (Mahadewi, Utama 2014). 
The Youth Congress of Beraban Village declared their solidarity for a larger share of the profits and 
accused the regency's administration of being "late and less than serious" in naming the future 
operators. Furthermore, a political coalition between the three leading political parties, who 
showed their solidarity to Beraban people, urged the Tabanan regency to make a decision in favour 
of village of Beraban (Bali Discovery 2/4/2011).The tension peaked when thousands of people of 
Beraban village participated in marches and protests, as the regency administration have not 
named the future operator of BPOWTL after the management contract with CV Ari Jasa Wisata 
expired on April 1, 2011 (Bali Discovery 2/4/2011).  
As a result, after a closed meeting at the Tabanan regent's office, it was determined that the 
management of the tourism object will be shared by the village of Beraban and the regency's 
government (Bali Discovery 9/4/2011). More precisely, the agreement 2002-2011 between the 
Tabanan government, CV Ari Jasa Wisata and the village of Beraban was terminated and as a result 
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its part was going to be divided with the recommendations of the regional House of 
Representatives (DPRD-Tabanan). The Bendesa of the village of Beraban, Wayan Arwata, 
commented that he was very satisfied with the new agreement achieved with the Tabanan 
government (Bali Discovery 9/4/2011; Berita Bali 4/4/2011). 
This case illustrated aroused business interests of the local village population of Beraban and has 
encouraged their confidence in their ability to independently manage this cultural heritage site 
without the assistance of a private firm. That a private company lost control over Tanah Lot profit, 
might be seen as an improvement in the position for Balinese in centre-periphery relations. On the 
other hand, excluding a business oriented firm, who succeeded in the development of Tanah Lot, 
might be seen as short-sighted decision, directed by self-interest of Beraban Village, not Tanah Lot 
itself. In other words, the pragmatism of the Beraban Village community tends to be directed 
towards strictly material interests, while the consideration for the interests of preserving this 
significant site with its Heritage and Value entrenched within Tanah Lot Temple is still highly 
doubtful. Especially in light of the fact, that currently officers from the Anti-corruption Division 
(Tipikor) are investigating the case of a shortfall in funds deposited by the Tanah Lot operators into 
the Tabanan Regency’s bank accounts during 2012. The estimated loss to the government is Rp. 
256 million. Investigators also found that a payment of Rp. 463.345 million for a religious ceremony 
authorized by the Regent of Tabanan as the chairman of the Tanah Lot Management Board was not 
in accordance with the agreement between the Regency and the Village (Villa op Bali 2014). 
Okinawa vs. Tokyo: origins of opposition  
In contrast to Bali cases, Okinawa shows firm control of the state. However the origins of centre - 
periphery conflict are different.  
In 1868, Japan’s Meiji Restoration greatly transformed its political structure and achieved the 
rebirth of Japan as a modern nation. Shortly after, in 1879, the Ryūkyū kingdom was overthrown 
and became annexed to Japan, transformed into Okinawa Prefecture. The multicultural archipelago, 
which combined Ryūkyū, Japanese and Chinese culture for many centuries, faced strict mainland 
control of their most essential parts of everyday life. the people of Okinawa were deprived of their 
self-governance, denied their culture, and forced to assimilate into Japanese practices. For example, 
the old Ryūkyūan customs of women’s tattooing and men’s topknot hairstyle were banned and 
completely wiped out. Additionally, the Lifestyle Reform Movement imposed by the government 
prohibited Okinawans from having social gatherings and seeing yuta (a spiritual counselor), and 
simplified their ceremonial practices (Toshiaki Arashiro 1995). While Japan’s assimilation policies 
forced Okinawans to become “Japanese,” the Empire continued to position Okinawans as “primitive 
natives;” as opposed to the ostensibly-civilized Japanese.  
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During World War II, the Empire of Japan sacrificed Okinawa as a command post for Imperial 
Japanese forces to protect its mainland. One fourth of the prefecture’s residents were killed at the 
Battle of Okinawa (Toshiaki Arashiro 1995). Later, when Japan lost the war, it relinquished 
Okinawa to a newly created foreign entity, the United States Civil Administration of the Ryūkyū 
Islands (USCAR). Lands were forcibly taken from the indigenous Okinawan people and fundamental 
human rights for local Okinawans were violated. After 27 years of struggle, Okinawa was returned 
to Japan in 1972, although, its people’s demands remain neglected, and the military bases still 
occupy Okinawa, occupying 20% of Okinawa Island (Okinawa Prefecture Military Base Affairs 
Division 2010). 
Because of its status as “Okinawa Prefecture” since 1972, Okinawan self-determination has been 
subsumed into the category of ethnic minority, rather than as an inherently sovereign people. 
Perceived discrimination against Okinawans by mainland Japanese has caused additional 
resentment. The Ryukyu language and culture, though closely related to Japanese, is nonetheless 
distinctive. According to the 2007 survey on Okinawan identity conducted by Lim Chuan Tiong, a 
professor of the University of the Ryūkyūs, 43.8% of Okinawa resident respondents asserted that 
the Japanese government’s attitude towards Okinawa is “not friendly,” and 56.6% expressed 
dissatisfaction towards Japan’s Okinawa policies (2008). Furthermore, many Japanese consider 
Okinawans to be Japanese, ignoring their distinct ethnic identity and historical heritage (Chibana 
2012: 50). 
Okinawa vs. Tokyo: Tourism Development of Okinawa 
After WWII, the central government treated Okinawa as a special case by providing a budget to 
support tourism development, though it took a long time for Okinawans to realize that the 
prefecture had anything marketable for tourism. The Battle of Okinawa had left the southern half of 
the main island stripped of greenery and cultural assets (including Shuri Castle). Okinawas was 
“littered with bones and unexploded ordnance, and populated by a foreign military that occupied 
prime real estate and rebuilt the island’s infrastructure according to its own strategic needs” (Figal 
2008: 87).  
During the 1950s and 1960s Okinawans were criticized for the lack of “tourism consciousness” 
(kankō ishiki): not recognizing the potential value of Okinawa as tourist destination; and once 
tourists arrived, not knowing how to meet their expectations. The expectations were clearly high, 
considering the fact, that Japanese government focused Okinawa’s economic development on 
tourism improvement. Being the southernmost prefecture of Japan, Okinawa could attract tourists 
for its subtropical climate, which transformed into ‘tropicalization’ of Okinawa for mainland 
Japanese tourists beginning in the 1960s. On the other hand, rich history gave the opportunity for 
cultural heritage tourism escalation, turning bitter memories into tourist attractions. 
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After the central government launched the first Okinawa Development Plan (1976-1981), the local 
authorities began promoting tourism to the islands. The main intention was to make Okinawa look 
and feel more tropical, cultivate and enhance its “southern island feel” (nangokuteki na kibun). 
Experts from mainland argued that Okinawa’s subtropical climate and flora offered a medium 
through which to modulate the harsh realities of jungle warfare many Japanese veterans had 
experienced less than twenty years previous, transforming those war experiences into pleasant 
memories of the tropics, manifested in a tropicalized tourist destination that also featured war 
memorials to their fallen buddies. In fact, beautification plans for the dozens of mainland 
prefectural war memorials on Mabuni Hill in the Peace Memorial Park included hibiscus, deigo 
(Indian coral bean, the prefectural flower), and banyan trees, bringing a “southern island feel” to 
the rows of monuments on this former battleground that overlook the Pacific Ocean and East China 
Sea (Figal 2008). 
To achieve a tropical effect for Tourist Okinawa, Senge, one of the state tourism experts, details the 
kind of (mostly non-native) plants, such as palms and exotic flowers, that should be planted 
alongside the native ‘tropicalesque sotetsu and adan’, which for him conjure up that “southern 
island feeling” and “a brightness and warmth you can’t taste on the mainland” when viewed against 
the backdrop of a vivid blue-green ocean. According to the new plan, heritage (and also tragic 
memories) was seen as a commodity and tourist’s attraction, while they were enjoying “Japanese 
Hawaii”. A Japanese tourist gaze has shaped the commodification of the islands for tourist 
consumption, raising questions of autonomy and authenticity in the production of “heritage” and 
built environments in Okinawa today (Figal 2008). In other words, local Okinawan cultural and 
historical identification with an independent pre-modern Ryukyu Kingdom—often with political 
overtones—co-exists in tension with an Okinawa wishfully cast as “Japan’s Hawaii” for local 
economic development that has increasingly been tied to tourism within the prefecture. 
Besides the tropicalization of the islands, the first Okinawa Tourism Plan emphasized infrastructure 
development. The policies and plans for tourism development in this period were mainly initiated 
by state entities which complement local administrative authorities. Furthermore, this policy 
attracted outside interest groups such as big tourist business and resort developers from mainland 
Japan, which caused massive exploitation of Okinawa’s natural resources (Lorthanavanich 2014: 
93). Government has consistently funded promotional efforts and there has been considerable 
cooperation from the private sector and the media. As a result, it was no longer promoted as a 
former battlefield, but a tropical destination, a resort island, and the location of several heritage 
sites. 
Under the fourth national development plan (2002-2011), the focus of the Okinawa Tourism 
Development Plan has changed. Because of its geographical location, Okinawa was recognized as 
having an important role both politically and in terms of marine resources. The government 
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designated the island as a strategic location in the 'Southern Sea', as a hub linking Japan and other 
Asian countries. It began actively promoting foreign tourism, especially from the other parts of Asia, 
in order to boost the economic revival of rural areas (Lorthanavanich 2014: 94). 
Furthermore, development and Japanization continue to be promoted today, with the heavy burden 
being borne by Okinawans not yet resolved. While Okinawa Island comprises only 0.3% of Japan’s 
total land mass, it bears the burden of 70% of the U.S. military in Japan. These forces occupy 20% of 
the island causing not only environmental, but cultural problems. On local level, continuing ethnic 
discrimination and US military damage on local population, such as robbery, rapes and murders 
(Chibana 2012: 61), are almost unnoticed by the state. Prefecture has not received any help from 
the state to minimize the burden of US military bases, which makes the conflict between centre and 
periphery continue to accumulate. Okinawans’ demands for the total removal of the U.S. military 
and the full return of the land have not yet been fulfilled, even after 40 years since the reversion..  
Okinawa vs. Tokyo: Shurijō reconstruction 
The regeneration of Shuri Castle is the case of interest for this paper as a tool of tourist attraction. 
UNESCO World Heritage Site designation was used as the catalyst to attract regional development, 
including the creation of cultural tourism offering.  The politics of heritage were crucial in deciding 
on economic investment for tourism development and in the re-imagining of rural tourism of 
Okinawa (Lorthanavanich 2014: 98). Shuri Castle reconstruction was an example that indicated the 
role and influence of vested interests and other stakeholders, who exercise real power in 
developing the national economy and stimulating local economy. 
After the end of the WWII reconstruction of Shuri castle was seen as an unrealistic project. 
Assuming that Shuri Castle was lost forever, the Okinawa Tourism Development Corporation 
sought in 1969 to capitalize on the remains of the underground headquarters. It surveyed the site 
and drew up ambitious plans to turn it into a tourist attraction, but concluded that the damage to 
the entrances inflicted by the retreating Japanese army rendered such a plan impractical. To this 
day, a special branch of the Okinawa Prefectural government continues to survey the site with the 
goal of opening it to the public, but has thus far concluded that the tunnel entrances are too 
dangerous to excavate fully (Figal 2008; Tze May Loo 2014). 
However, couple of decades later, while Okinawa’s tropical transformation was in full swing, the 
idea of rebuilding of Shuri Castle, which was impossible twenty years earlier, came back to the 
mind of Tourist experts. Popular interest in this project fuelled growing expressions of Ryukyu 
identity in cultural and political spheres during the 1980s, so that by the early 1990s “Tropical 
Okinawa” was being fully grafted onto overt markers of “Ryukyu Okinawa,” both of which still 
existed alongside reminders of war.  
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The physical transformation of the Shuri Castle site from 1945 to the present is remarkable, but the 
castle’s rebuilding and its present look were by no means inevitable (Tze May Loo 2014). Despite 
widespread desire to overcome the war by restoring this icon of Ryukyu Kingdom identity, the 
project faced numerous obstacles. First, the American-built University of the Ryukyus occupied the 
site since 1950, a modern stand-in for the Main Hall of the former castle, as the stamp issued to 
commemorate its founding made clear. To accommodate a rebuilding of the former seat of the 
Ryukyu Kingdom government, the university buildings would have to be relocated, which they 
were in 1982. Second, the Japan’s Finance Ministry argued that because all tangible assets (except 
vestiges of foundations) of Shuri Castle had been destroyed in the war, the project could not be 
properly called a restoration (fukugen) to be funded under the tangible cultural assets provisions.  
Indeed, the Finance Ministry had a point. This was not going to be the restoration of damaged 
edifices as they had existed before the war. Rather, it would be a bigger and better resurrection of 
the entire castle complex based on what it looked like just after its last complete rebuilding in 18th 
century. (The May Loo 2014) Ironically, if not for its pulverization in the Battle of Okinawa, such a 
grandiose rebuilding would not have likely happened. In addition, the rebuilding was planned since 
1972 as a commemoration of Okinawa’s reversion to Japan, thus tying it to U.S. postwar occupation 
and resumption of Japanese rule. Any rebuilt Shuri Castle would thus be a kind of indirect war 
memorial. 
Local historians objected to these plans on the grounds that the money necessary to build what 
would amount to an “imitation” or “replica” would be better spent on actual historical edifices and 
cultural assets in dire need of repair and preservation. Shuri residents feared the ill effects of 
increased traffic and decreased quality of life in the area. However, Shuri was chosen to be the 
centre of development as a tourist product for the economic and social benefits and with the 
involvement of the interested stakeholders, but the interests of the local people were secondary. 
After heavy lobbying and a very public promotional campaign, the Shuri Castle Restoration 
Realization Association (Shuri Fukugen Kisei Kai), with help from the Prime Minister’s Office, 
ultimately shepherded the reconstruction of the central buildings and gates, most notably the 
Seiden (Figal 2008; Lorthanavanich 2014). 
Shuri Castle has become a major tourist attraction and has a park covering about 18 hectares 
surrounding it. In 2011, it attracted approximately 5.48 million tourists of whom 5.19 million were 
Japanese, with the remaining 290,000 being foreign tourist (Office of the Okinawa Prefecture, 
2011). The central government, the Okinawan authorities, the media and the tourism business 
network 'keiretsu' played a key role in stimulating consumption and choosing which local resources 
to develop as tourist commodities, that is why Shuri Castle is an outstanding example of capitalism 
and market led developmentalism (Lorthanavanich 2014: 97). 
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Conclusion 
The case of Tanah Lot reveals that the Bali periphery is greatly dependent on centre power and 
foreign profit seeking interest. Need for economic development caused significant shift in tourism 
development strategy from cultural heritage tourism into mass tourism. Mega-project development 
were seen as a fast way to maximize foreign tourist number to increase the profit from the heritage 
site. Nonetheless mega-developments were highly capitalised and in most cases owned by outside 
interests with close connections to Indonesia’s ruling elite, which brought together concerns of 
local community over the direction of environmental, cultural and social change in Bali. 
The centre-periphery conflict in Bali, caused by power-relationship, peaked with Bali Nirwana 
Resort construction. This case shows that regulation violation by private company backed by ruling 
elite was the reason of strong disapproval of development by local population. As a result, in case of 
Tanah Lot management local community showed more interest and insistence on involvement in 
heritage site tourism control.    
Okinawa’s tourism strategy is based on cultural heritage promotion, which led to developed 
tourism industry in previously partly destroyed island. The input of state budget allowed Shuri 
Castle to become one of the most visited heritage site in Okinawa. However, the discrimination of 
Okinawan as second-race nation and strong political control maintain the tension between 
mainland Japanese and local community. 
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CHAPTER 3: MASS TOURISM VS. HERITAGE TOURISM  
Mega Projects vs. Small Scale Tourism in Bali 
Indonesian authorities continue to demonstrate an insatiable appetite for tourism growth. In March 
2015 Tourism Minister Arief Yahya announced that Indonesia is on the right track in tourism 
development, predicting that foreign arrivals would hit 12 million by the end of 2015, increasing by 
more than 27% within a year. Obsequiously committed to achieving the pre-electoral projection by 
President Joko Widodo that Indonesia can reach 20 million tourists by 2019, Minister Yahya has 
relied on approximate calculations, saying Indonesia needs to increase foreign arrivals by an 
average 16% per year to surpass 20 million by 2019 (Bali Discovery 7/5/2015).  
Officially, since the Suharto regime, the main tourism development strategy was based on cultural 
tourism, however it was the construction of mega-complexes that has contributed to the increasing 
tourism rate. In combination with developed infrastructure and successful promotion, this kind of 
development caused Bali to become a prominent brand name worldwide representing a version of 
utopia (Hitchcock 2000). In the case of Tanah Lot management, beneficial location close to the 
Heritage Site complemented by luxury accommodations created blossoming conditions for tourist 
number maximization.   
The management of Tanah Lot Temple as a heritage has experienced a significant commodification 
of function. The notion, that usage of a “World Heritage” global brand might be profitable for 
marketing of the site, settled after UNEP and UNESCO World Heritage Centre workshop in 2002. 
The dialogue generated at the intervention workshop clearly confirmed the importance of linking 
World Heritage Sites in Indonesia and the rest of the world. The collaboration with the 
UNEP/UNESCO/WTO Tour Operators Initiative and successful marketing strategy would bring 
larger interest from foreign tourists (Hawkins 2004: 306).  
As a result, Tanah Lot Temple has been proposed to be designated as UNESCO’s World Heritage Site. 
To be enlisted the Site should be able to show its uniqueness by paying attention to its carrying 
capacity due to the possibility of overabundance of visitors, the readiness of its supporting facilities, 
the readiness of the local population in accepting visitors and everything that is involved with 
supporting a world heritage site, the expression of universal meaning of the site, and the planning 
for the management of the site with conservation as one of its ultimate goals in order to ensure 
long-term sustainability (Jamieson 1998). Even though Tanah Lot meets these requirements the 
controversy of power relationship and obvious deregulations around the site violations may be one 
of the reasons to delay the UNESCO decision. 
On the other hand,the coming Asian Heritage Network Symposium in 2016, which will be hosted by 
Denpasar (Bali Discovery 6/21/2015), might change perception of Tanah Lot management, when 
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participants make field visits to traditional/cultural events and see how heritage values are being 
preserved in development planning.  
Developers understand that Heritage environment function is not only to draw tourists' spending 
from those wishing to experience the past, but also to provide a setting for entertainment, 
relaxation, or shopping along with affordable accommodation. However there is still lack of 
attention to infrastructure and waste management (Burke and Resosudarmo 2012).  
Since there is no strong necessity for new hotels in Tanah Lot tourism area, cultural heritage 
tourism may show better results cooperating with small-scale business than luxury resorts and big 
hotels.  
Certainly, mega-projects provide accommodation for larger number of tourists, which is crucial 
point for tourism developers. Notably, mega-projects include not only luxury resorts, but also “star-
hotel” type of accommodation. There is large number of star-hotels in Tanah Lot area focusing more 
on middle class tourists, who accommodate profit not by quality but by quantity, unlike luxury 
resorts planned on wealthy visitors (Hotel News Resource 2015).  
There are growing concerns about mega-project expansion and its effects on local population. Some 
researches claim that a new approach to tourism planning is urgently needed. This is seen in issues 
of power and control, and also in the economic case for local community participation (Hampton 
2005). The first step could be, if tourism departments and local authorities could engage with and 
listen to the local communities who live within and near attractions. 
One possible way forward is through creating effective partnerships between host communities 
and the authorities, so that local people feel that the attraction is their heritage site as well as the 
tourists. Obviously, tourism sector generates additional employment for local population. Currently, 
the more significant income stream comes to local community from direct tourist expenditures on 
souvenirs, food and drink, local transport, tour guides and accommodation. There is also small 
number of people working on the heritage site.  
A substantial proportion of employment in the shops and restaurants usually consists of family 
members of the owners who often originate from the nearby towns, rather than local villages. The 
informal sector, as a third group, includes hawkers of souvenirs, postcards, cold drinks, cigarettes, 
and confectionery (Salazar 2005; Wall 1997). The bigger share of non-star accommodation owned 
by locals would generate bigger profit for community without enriching mega corporations. 
Furthermore, regarding investment, by definition, small-scale businesses generally have low capital 
requirements, and thus low entry costs. If the local authorities attempt to control the development, 
then licenses may be required of the small businesses, or rent paid for stalls, shops, or restaurants. 
Larger businesses can then compete more strongly with the initial entrants who, lacking capital, are 
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unable to develop their businesses or build or rent permanent sites (Hampton 2005). Thus, local 
small-scale businesses appears desirable, rather than a continuing ‘‘bigger is better’’ mindset to 
generate real economic and social benefits for their local host communities. 
There are also concerns from the local people about the site, their level of involvement, ‘‘ownership’’ 
of the site, the mix of local and outside control of businesses, and ideas and concerns about 
managing the site all constitute appropriate agenda items. The conflict involves not only Jakarta 
based entrepreneurs, but also internationals, especially Australian small business owners.   
Some researches argue that planners assume that small-scale business and hawkers may gradually 
disappear over time as the economy ‘‘modernizes’’, and so they do not need to be included in the 
plans. The smaller players may eventually be absorbed by larger, more capital-intensive, businesses 
as the destination moves up the resort cycle. However, there is evidence that in last 4 years room 
occupancy rate of classified star-hotel, decreased (BPS 2013), which might suggest, that small scale 
business is growing. On the other hand, it is hard to measure the connection of locals in this regard. 
Cultural Heritage Tourism as a Tool: Okinawa 
Japan chose a different strategy for Tourism development in its province Okinowa. Tze Mao Loo 
(2014: 13) argues, that the Japanese state preserved and appropriated Okinawa’s cultural heritage 
in attempt to control and discipline cultural differences between mainland Japan and Okinawa. 
Similarly, cultural heritage gave Okinawan a powerful way to resist Japanese and American rule 
and negotiate a more equitable position for them. 
Japan has a long-standing heritage conservation and preservation practice initiated at the end of 
19th century, for the protection of cultural properties after Meiji Restoration. The legal 
environment and cooperation of national and local governments led to the successful restoration 
and protection of local, prefectural and national heritage (Casey 2013: 137). By 2009, Japan had 85 
listed historic buildings located in 73 towns, and 38 prefectures that were listed and managed by 
local administrative authorities (Lorthanavanich 2014: 90).  
Cultural heritage tourism - defined as travel concerned with experiencing the visual and performing, 
historical monuments,  arts, heritage buildings, landscapes, special values and traditions - has 
become a major force in Okinawa tourism. Heritage as an interpretation of past events is open to 
appropriation by sectional interests within society. The commodification of the past has provided a 
mechanism whereby city authorities can refashion sites and direct the tourist gaze towards a 
limited range of interpretation (Waitt 2000), even when the past is dark. Indeed, Dark Tourism 
became a part of cultural heritage tourism in Postwar Okinawa and war memories gained 
commodification function from the 1960s:  
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Alongside its sun, sea, and Ryukyuan landmarks, Okinawa’s war memorials and U.S. military 
facilities complete the outsider image of Okinawa. They are arguably part of its “heritage” 
and definitely part of its tourist interest. Yet, despite its historical significance and deep, 
abiding impact for over a half century now, the Battle of Okinawa and its consequences are 
not promoted within heritage tourism; they figure even less in pure beach resort tourism. It 
would somehow seem obscene to include this modern history and this form of foreign 
relations in a display of heritage based on the pre-modern history of the Ryukyu Kingdom 
and its peaceful foreign relations. The war and its reminders are not ignored in Okinawa 
tourism; they are just not explicitly defined as “heritage” (Figal 2008: 104). 
On the other hand, battlefield sites and memorials were rarely openly promoted by tourism officials 
as an Okinawan heritage, even though it was seen as a tourist attraction. Notably, the oldest form of 
organized tourism on Okinawa were bus guide tours to these sites, which still remain popular for 
mainland Japanese interested in the modern history of the island. 
Distinctively, the rapid “tropicalization” of the island caused mass development of swimming 
beaches, hotels, restaurants, shopping centres, and other entertainment complexes. New strategy 
“to make Okinawa Japan’s Hawaii and attract droves of tourists” did not take to consideration 
Okinawan perception of their land and attitude to new development. Instead developers were more 
concerned of turning the island into new tourist destination for mainland Japanese by maximizing 
its tourist potential. To do so, tourist office promoted Okinawa as exotic, but also familiar and 
inexpensive destination, where Japanese can “taste foreign travel while speaking Japanese” (Figal 
2008: 97). 
Along with tropicalization, local governments have also tried to re-create cultural and historical 
heritage to attract tourist for economic benefits. Some researches argue, that this strategy was 
directed not only to tourists, but mostly to local population to improving the quality of environment 
for them (Lorthanavanich 2014; Tze Mao Loo 2014). Consequently, since the 1990s the Japanese 
government has been actively promoting cultural and natural heritage at the local level making 
culture as a core of local development. The case of Shuri Castle reconstruction reveals hidden 
motives of both Okinawan and Japanese state sides. The Shuri Castle was seen as a symbol of 
Okinawan value to the state, for mainland officials it was rather a distraction for Okinawan from 
unfulfilled promises of Reversion of quality with the mainland cast (Tze Mao Loo 2014: 179). 
In concern of tourism this policy also succeeded, although revitalization of heritage sites required 
big budget input. Besides the reconstruction cost, the central government allocated a budget of 23 
billion yen (€168 million) to be used over a five-year period to fund mega-projects that improved 
access, enhanced townscapes, and developed tourist facilities to an international standard in Naha 
City and other towns where the World Heritage properties are located (Lorthanavanich 2014: 94). 
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This included buildings such as a visitor centre, car parks, and tourist information office. The area 
around Shuri Castle was developed in according to “Furusato” tourism initiative.  This Heritage 
regeneration was an important process for the revitalization of villages, town or cities which had a 
unique culture but did not have much industrial or commercial infrastructure to create 
employment for locals. It used to be a common governmental practice to develop regions using a 
combination of heritage regeneration and tourism development as mechanism (Casey 2013: 138; 
Lorthanavanich 2014: 88). 
As a result, Shuri neighbourhood with rich natural, historic and cultural resources and became one 
of the main sightseeing destinations in the Prefecture. Notably, Shuri is a typical residential 
neighbourhood having schools, a library, a community centre and a city government branch office 
with the Heritage Site in the heart of the community. To preserve locals from tourism distraction, 
the Naha city planning division has created a buffer zone with 2.5 m wide tourism corridor, 
meandering 7 km through Kinjo district. This corridor connects mini-parks, playgrounds and 
heritage sites, and is dedicated to walking and biking. Thus, the corridor provides not only a buffer 
between tourist activity and residential areas, clear direction for tourists and a protected 
environment for residents (Miyakuni, Stoep 2006: 304). Naha City has been working to preserve 
old and construct new red-tile-roofed houses by providing landscape subsidies to residents. In 
combination with developed infrastructure and small business opportunities, Shuri neighbourhood 
became a successful example cultural heritage tourism area without damage to the local population. 
Actually, residents benefit from tourist as they bring profit to the local business. 
In 1992, the year when Shuri castle was reconstructed, it drew over two million visitors, half of 
tourist arrivals to Okinawa, quarter of whom (37.7%) were from Tokyo. Indeed, as tourism was 
mainly oriented on domestic market, there is no significant data on foreign tourist arrivals till 2004. 
Under the 4th national development plan (2002-2011), the government began actively promoting 
foreign tourism, especially from the other parts of Asia, in order to boost the economic revival of 
rural areas (Lorthanavanich 2014: 94). International attention to the Site was also gained by its 
nomination to UNESCO list. As a result, the number of foreign tourist increased, however its 
proportion stays relatively small: in 2014 there were more than 6 million domestic arrivals from 
over 7 million in total (Okinawa Prefecture official website). Available evidence suggest, that 
Okinawan tourism is successful not only in attraction new visitors, but also “repeaters” (Ito, 
Itowashi 2013: 15), who came to enjoy peaceful, natural environment rich, slow life atmosphere. 
Business flourishing and Cultural Change 
The debate on culture, contemporarily, is no longer about expression, imagination, and creativity, 
but rather addressing culture as a tourism product. Culture is consumed as a commodity because 
within it exists as experiential value. In today’s society, culture and its heritage are often turned 
into an economically valuable commodity for the needs and interests of the tourism industry. 
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Tourism is a soft development that is seen to be more beneficial overall economic effects than 
conventional for local communities (Burke and Resosudarmo 2012).  However as any other 
development it changes community lifestyle and if physical changes could be predicted or avoided, 
cultural changes cannot be easily controlled. The main issues connected to cultural heritage 
tourism, in order to gain more profit, is commodification and ‘falsification’ of culture. These changes 
might seem insignificant, if it is seen from short term perspective. 
Bali experiences rapid economic growth because of tourism sector impact, especially international 
tourism . Indeed the number of foreign visitor arrivals in Bali increased from 24,000 in 1970 to 1.4 
million international tourists in 2000.  Terrorist attacks in Kuta and Legian on October 2002 caused 
a decrease in arrivals. However, it took only one year to bring numbers back. Since then, the 
number of direct foreign arrivals continues to grow tremendously, reaching 3.7 million tourists in 
2014 (Bali Statistics Office, Bali Government Tourism Office, Bali Tourism Board). Additionally, 
there were also many domestic tourists visiting Bali from other regions of Indonesia. Although no 
definite number of domestic tourists is available, it was estimated that there were about 2.9 million 
domestic tourists who visited the island via two entry points of the Ngurah Rai Airport (Domestic 
Terminal) and the Gilimanuk Harbour (Wiranatha and Pujaastawa, 2009).   
There is no wonder, that Bali’s GDP continues growing: 2015 first quarter growth was 6.2% 
reaching in total Rp 41.99 trillion based on current prices (ADHB) and Rp.31.02 trillion on constant 
prices (ADHK) (Bali BPS 2015). Around half of Bali’s economy relies on tourism. In past decades, it 
has made a large contribution to poverty reduction in Bali, which has the lowest poverty rate of 
provinces outside Jakarta – of 4.2% in 2011, compared with the national rate of 12.5%, however is 
slightly grew till 4.5% in 2014 (BPS 2015).  
Besides the tropical climate, culture has always been the island's strongest attraction, ranging from 
the beautiful Hindu temples to the native dances and traditional arts. The notion of cultural tourism 
“implied not only the commodification of culture but also the ‘touristification’ of society, blurring 
artificial boundaries between culture (inside) and tourism (outside)”(Nordhold 2007). As a result, 
Balinese people started considering their culture as a marketable object, and essentially adopting it 
to the needs and expectations of tourists. 
The notion of cultural tourism implied not only the commodification of culture but also the 
touristification of society. The Balinese are deeply attached to their religion and culture: they spend 
a lot of time in the temples and respect the ritual. But mass tourism has upset such practices: the 
diversity of local cultures and the specific character of certain rites are being harmonized. 
Foreigners are offered a standardised package (Bruno 2012). Furthermore, there is a possibility of 
growing ‘falsification’ around culture. ‘Falsification’ is the political concern that people in power 
(re)invent traditions to some benefit (Casey 2013: 131). 
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Tanah Lot Temple as a place of interest for tourism in Bali has accelerated the physical 
development of Beraban Village as a whole, yet the behaviour of the local population that was 
expected to be conservers for this site has shifted into consumers (Mahadewi, Utama 2014). Tanah 
Lot Temple has been packaged as a tourism commodity to attain the maximum economic benefits 
from it. As a result, there are associated dangers with this kind of behaviour, such as congestion, 
over-commercialization, reduction in the quality of visitor experiences, and occasional destruction 
of the resource (Wall 1997: 241). To contain cultural integrity Heritage Site management should be 
seen not only with the materialistic interest, but interests of preserving this significant site with its 
Heritage and Value. 
Generally, Tourism developers were trying to avoid or at least decrease tourism effect on 
population by Master Plan 71. As Adams (1997: 158) has noted, the goal of inventing tourism zones 
was not only to earn foreign exchange and improve Indonesia’s international reputation, but also to 
increase domestic social stability by separating it from tourism industry impact. Unfortunately, 
Master Plan developers did not accounted impact on local population which live in tourism zones. 
However some researches argue that despite short-term disruptions of tourism and criticisms of its 
adverse effects tourism in Indonesia will play more important role in the longer-term future (Blake, 
Sinclair, Sugiyarto 2003: 686) and we can already see that in local community economic 
improvement. One of cultural positive impact might be that globalization and touristification of 
society motivated Balinese culture to ‘folklorize’, with an emphasis on ‘culture-as-art’ and on the 
visual and performative dimensions of culture (Hitchcock King 20: 10). 
Social changes also included a massive inflow of Muslim labor migrants from neighboring islands, 
causing the unpleasant feeling that Balinese are becoming a minority on their own island (Reuter 
2009). This feeling is understandable, as in the beginning of tourism development the central 
government-driven promoted some ethnic groups as more cultural than others, particularly, in this 
case, the Balinese (Adams, 1997:158). 
Same as Bali, Japan used Okinawa’s culture and heritage to attract visitors, without intention to 
separate them. As tourism consciousness slowly developed among Okinawans, locals were adapting 
accordingly to meet the desires and demands of outsiders, but not without underlying tensions 
when a sense of identity and authenticity seems to be threatened (Figal 2008). Ultimately, the 
tensions among war legacies, tropical visions, and a romanticized Ryukyuan past existed and still 
exist, Okinawan learned to accept its hybrid culture (McCormack 2009). The state is aware that the 
strong sense of belonging, the desire to preserve communal values and unique shared heritage that 
have evolved in Okinawa are important elements for influencing the management of heritage 
attractions (Lorthanavanich 2014: 98). 
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Commodification and falsification of the culture on one side and tension between the locals, the 
state and US reflected on tourism development. Some researches argue that Japan is facing the 
problem of how to upgrade its tourism industry. The same problem is also shown in terms of 
tourists’ incomes as a percentage of GDP and external receipts which have kept almost constant for 
more than the past decade, even when the number of visitors has risen. Okinawa remains Japan's 
poorest Prefecture with lowest Prefectural income per capita (Japan Statistical Yearbook 2015) and 
is still fully dependant on tourism. Furthermore, continuing discrimination from mainland Japanese, 
violation from US military bases soldiers, and constant reminder of wartime make tourism effect on 
culture quite irrelevant. More important is that slogan for “Okinawa’s postwar will not end until 
Shuri Castle is restored” (Figal 2008: 89) also means more than simply recovering what war had 
taken away and thus putting an end to a highly-charged physical absence; it also suggests 
overcoming the American Occupation because the restoration necessitated the removal of the 
American-built University of the Ryukyus. 
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CONCLUSION 
On the outset of the research performed above, the objective was to discover in which ways cultural 
heritage tourism could be used successfully as a tool for economic development. In the case study 
comparisons several conceptual tools were utilized in order to highlight the ways in which it is 
possible for such development strategies to be a success. The first of such is the idea of centre-
periphery conflicts realized in the relationships between national government in the state capital 
city and the identities and perceived economic needs of communities on the outskirts of “regular 
society”. While in the case of Indonesia, the periphery other was seen as cultural heritage that could 
be utilized as an economic selling point. However, what came to be was commodification of culture 
into mass-tourism, which peaked with the Bali Nirvana Resort construction. Media was used as a 
voice of locals to opponent state policy and attracts regional and national attention. Today, the 
conflict has come to an end, though small scale conflict of Tanah Lot management ownership still 
exists. Japan, on the other hand, had no major tourism management conflicts with Okinawa. 
Nonetheless, mainland interest in developing Okinawa arises from differences in history and 
heritage perception. This comes from the late return of Okinawa to the Japan as a country, and the 
need to control a portion of the population who saw themselves inherently different from the rest 
of Japan, both due to heritage and recent history. Control was done in a positive sense by enabling 
this culture and heritage for uses of economic development. This was done for the benefit of both 
core and periphery. What was learned from this is that the small scale business is more beneficial 
for the local community, because it provides the control over profit. The case of Shuri castle is a 
good example how state input and regulations created the successful touristic area without strong 
effect on local neighbourhood. 
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